Transport Minister John Graham says the state government has accepted all 12 recommendations made by a scathing report into a snapped wire that caused two days of bedlam across Sydney’s train network.
Sydney’s rail network was plunged into chaos in May when an overhead wire powering a train broke just before it reached Homebush station, causing widespread disruptions and leaving hundreds trapped on-board for hours before they could be evacuated.
An independent report into the incident found the thin wire was identified as an issue five years earlier but never repaired and recommended sweeping changes to Sydney Trains, including an internal audit and improved messaging to customers.
Speaking on the review, Mr Graham said Sydneysiders expected “a safe and reliable rail network – and right now, it’s not up to scratch”.
Transport Minister John Graham said the state government has accepted all 12 recommendations. Picture: NewsWire / Nikki Short
“A well-managed rail maintenance program could — and should — have fixed this fault after it was detected and prevented the disruption affecting so many,” he said,
Opposition Leader Mark Speakman claimed the rail system “after three Chris Minns budgets has become progressively worse”.
“Where is Chris Minns on a day when we have this scathing report into our train system?” he said.
Scathing report into train chaos
The independent review into the incident found the wire had been detected as “thin” as far back as 2020 but not logged in Sydney Trains’ defect management system.
Undertaken by Teksol International, the measurements detected the overhead wire as being close to the elastic limit of 10.1mm and that the defect ran for 630mm.
The measurements were not part of routine maintenance, the report found, and instead commissioned to “inform long-term asset management strategies”.
As such, it was not integrated into the defect management system and did not trigger a work order for repairs.
More than 300 people were evacuated after being trapped on the train near Strathfield station when high voltage wires collapsed on top. Picture: Nine News
The report noted of “equal, if not greater concern” was that subsequent routine inspections since 2020 had also failed to detect the thin wire.
The most recent visual inspection of the wire at Homebush station was on April 8, just weeks before the incident.
An internal investigation by Sydney Trains found the method for visual inspections was inadequate, requiring workers to use binoculars from a distance.
“Inspections are done in daylight hours, but the frequency of trains prevents workers from having access to the track and the inspection team simply cannot get an adequate view,” the report found.
“They must stand too far away and cannot view the full length of the wire from various positions and angles.”
The second form of routine inspection, a hands-on inspection, also failed to detect the thin wire when it was conducted in October 2024.
A hands-on inspection is required every four years at crossover points and every eight years over straight tracks.
Sydney Trains found, as per the report, that the job card used by inspectors did not provide specific direction to inspect the wire.
“It seems that staff were unaware that they needed to do so,” the report found
“This is because the job card used an abbreviated description of the tasks to be done.”
Issues with the wire were detected five years earlier but not repaired. Picture: NewsWire / John Appleyard
Communications during days-long chaos
The report found the time between the May 2025 incident and the recovery two days later was “far too long”.
“One of the main reasons for that appears to be a lack of management capability in dealing with an incident of this kind,” it stated.
“In this incident the leadership did not appear to be confident, strong or disciplined and the teams were not deployed by that leader as we would have expected.
“Part of the issue was a lack of qualifications in the operation of the railway and the safety procedures and rules that accompany that operation.
“The incident was managed as a sequence of tasks, with debates concerning the appropriate procedures even before those tasks commenced.”
The report noted the “disturbing feature” of the absence of effective communication on the day of the incident and the day after.
“The passengers stuck on the train did not know what was happening; the passengers expecting to get a train home did not know either; and neither did the general public.
“The government received some limited communication from Sydney Trains but not in detail and not reliable, especially about available trains running or when normal operations would recommence.”
The report found “no defensible reason” as to why it took so long to detrain passengers at Homebush.
It noted customers, who were on-board the T2 from Leppington to Central shortly before 3pm on May 20, suffered a loss of power and airconditioning after more than an hour stuck inside after the batteries fell flat.
“The effect on passengers was understandably distressing and some became very anxious,” the report said, noting one passenger was diabetic.
“The guard and staff on the train managed the situation by quietly moving those passengers that they knew needed priority detraining towards the front of the train where this would occur.
“Regrettably, it was not until 4.37pm, more than 100 minutes after the train came to a standstill, that detraining from the front of the train began.”
Sydney Trains chief executive Matt Longland at Central Station. Picture: NewsWire / Monique Harmer
The last passenger did not leave the train until 5.57pm.
The need to cut power at the “critical junction” meant six tracks could not run passenger services.
“The impact of this rippled out across the network as Sydney Trains’ ability to run timetabled services on all but one line (the Illawarra T4 service) was irreparably compromised,” the report stated.
“By the end of the day, 1288 train services were affected – more than 80 per cent of these cancellations – disrupting the commutes and the lives of thousands.”
Services did not return to normal until the morning of May 22.
Significant recommendations
The report also made sweeping recommendations of Sydney Trains, including across infrastructure and fleet management, at rail command, and crew systems.
The recommendations include more effective tools for routine inspections, exploring the use of cameras to monitor wires, and possible use of AI to review footage to “assist in identifying anomalies in the condition of infrastructure”.
The agency was recommended to within six months design “simple messaging” for customers on information boards and third-party apps “describing the types
and frequency of services under the alternate plan(s)”.
Within 12 months, Sydney Trains was urged to implement an electronic train transposition system, replacing the current paper-based method for advising train crew of changes to their routes during disruptions to timetabled services.
Among the dozen changes, Sydney Trains as also recommended to massively revamp its central command offices and establish an internal audit function focusing on operational and safety risks.
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